Global Food Security Governance: The Committee for World Food Security, Comprehensive Framework for Action and the G8/G20 by Margulis, Matias
GLOBAL FOOD SECURITY GOVERNANCE: THE COMMITTEE FOR WORLD 
FOOD SECURITY, COMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION AND THE 
G8/G20 
 
 
Matias E. Margulis 
Lecturer in Political Economy 
Division of History and Politics 
University of Stirling, Stirling  
FK9 4LA Scotland 
Email: m.e.margulis@stir.ac.uk  
Tel: +44 (0)1786 467585 
 
 
* This an accepted version of a chapter published in Rosemary Rayfuse & Nicole Wiesfelt 
(eds.), The Challenge of Food Security (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishers, 2012): 231-
254.  This material is copyrighted and any download is for personal use only. 
 
 
 Introduction 
Eradicating world hunger has been a long-standing objective of the international 
community. Following the creation of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the 
United Nations (UN) in 1945 to ‘ensure freedom from hunger’, subsequent decades saw a 
proliferation of international institutions charged with addressing the manifold and complex 
causes of hunger. At present there are over a dozen international institutions active in the 
field of food security. Working alongside these institutions are numerous regional, non-
governmental and private organizations. This decentralized patchwork of institutions 
constitutes what may be best described as global food security governance.  
This chapter analyzes key, recent institutional developments in global food security 
governance. These include the reform of the Committee on World Food Security (CFS), the 
negotiation of the Comprehensive Frame for Action (CFA), and the emergence of the 
Group of Eight (G8)/Group of Twenty (G20) as a multilateral food security forum. These 
institutional developments share a common origin: they were direct responses to the 2008 
global food crisis. These three institutions are playing new and significant roles in global 
food security governance. However, they diverge significantly with respect to their 
memberships, authority and sources of legitimacy. These differences increasingly matter as 
these institutions increasingly interact with one another in the global policy and political 
arena. A critical challenge is how the relationship between these three institutions should be 
mediated, particularly with respect to the coherence and legitimacy of global food security 
governance in an era of unprecedented world hunger. 
The chapter begins with an examination of the evolving architecture of global food 
security governance. The second section analyzes the CFS, CFA, and G8/G20 and 
contextualizes their role in global food security governance. The third section examines the 
interrelationship among the CFS, CFA and G8/G20, including ongoing efforts to mediate 
and coordinate their policies.  
 
 
Evolving Architecture of Global Food Security Governance 
The architecture of global food security governance is best characterized as one of 
continuous transformation. The present governance framework for world food security is 
significantly different from the original arrangements devised by the post-war architects. 
Four dimensions of transformation can be identified with respect to global food security 
governance: the number of international institutions; variation in institutional forms; 
knowledge of food security; diffusion of food security as an international norm and 
practice. All four of these dimensions are interconnected, with developments in each 
dimension affecting the other. Each of these dimensions is briefly discussed below.1   
 
 
Increasing density of international institutions 
With respect to the first dimension, it can be noted that multiple international institutions 
are involved in the governance of food security. Indeed, the general trend has been toward a 
proliferation of international institutions over time. Since the establishment of the FAO in 
1945, subsequent decades have seen a proliferation of new international institutions. Most 
of these institutions are part of the framework of the UN system with many having 
 originated as subunits of the FAO that eventually became independent, including the World 
Food Program (WFP), the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), and 
the Standing Committee on Nutrition (SCN). A significant number of international food 
security institutions have also been established under the auspices of World Bank Group 
such as the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR). Other 
international institutions are independent of the UN or Bretton Woods institutions, such as 
the Food Aid Committee (FAC). 
 
Table 1: Selected International Institutions relevant to Food Security  
 
 
 This proliferation of international institutions responsible for food security reveals a 
pattern of punctuated, rather than gradual, growth. Indeed, four key periods of proliferation 
can be identified, as highlighted in Table 1 which lists selected global food security 
governance institutions, including the years they were established and their mandates.  
The first period occurred during the late 1960s and saw the development of new 
international food assistance institutions in response to growing demand for food aid in 
developing countries and the emergence of food surpluses among Western grain producing 
countries. Key institutions that emerged during this period were the WFP and the FAC. The 
second period of institutional proliferation occurred after the 1970s world food crisis. 
During this period the CFS, IFAD, World Food Council (WFC) and the CGIAR were 
established.2 A third period of punctuated institutional growth, for which the 1996 World 
Food Summit (WFS) and its follow-up in 2001 were the catalytic events, occurred during 
the late 1990s and early 2000s. Those summits led to international consensus to reduce 
world hunger in half by 2015, an objective now enshrined as the first Millennium 
Development Goal,3 a global plan of action to address food insecurity,4 and an international 
set of voluntary guidelines on the human right to food.5 The 2008 global food crisis 
resulted in the most recent period of institutional proliferation including the establishment 
of the UN High-Level Task Force on the Global Food Security Crisis and the G8 Global 
Partnership on Agriculture, Food Security and Nutrition.  
 
Variation in institutional forms 
Global food security governance also displays a significant variation of institutional 
mechanisms over time, ranging from ‘bricks and mortar’ formal institutions to informal 
networks, to voluntary guidelines. The 1940s to 1970s witnessed the growth of formal 
international institutions with specialized mandates, complex and hierarchical internal 
organizational structures, and staffed by international bureaucrats. Beginning in the 1990s 
there was a marked shift towards a greater emphasis on expanding the principles and rules 
based framework for food security. The declarations adopted by the 1996 and 2001 World 
Food Summits and norm creation by the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights advanced international consensus on the human right to food and elaborated its 
programmatic and legal content.6 More recently, the role of transnational networks of 
government officials and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) has become increasingly 
prominent in global food security governance, such as those that participate in the SCN, the 
CFS and the G8. 
 
Knowledge and food security  
Developing awareness of the causes and effects of food security have similarly influenced 
the practices of global food security governance. The term ‘food security’ first entered the 
lexicon during the 1970s world food crisis.7 That crisis revealed to policy makers new 
drivers of hunger, such as price volatility and the unreliability of food supply on 
international markets. The first world food crisis also challenged assumptions about how 
world food markets worked and focused the attention of states on exploring new 
instruments of international cooperation.8 As the concept of food security continued to 
evolve, it incorporated advances in the understanding of the causes of hunger. In particular, 
the work of Nobel Prize winning economist Amartya Sen, which demonstrated that access 
 to food, and not just food supply, was critical to averting famine, reoriented international 
policies to look beyond traditional food production and supply issues.9 In turn, it initiated a 
major rethink of international food security policies away from the old approach of 
traditional bulk transfers of food towards incorporating a set of interventions targeting 
various dimensions and scales, including a greater attention to economic, physical, and 
social access to food. This multifaceted understanding became the basis of the current 
international consensus definition of food security, which states that “food security exists 
when all people, at all times, have physical, social, and economic access to sufficient, safe 
and nutritious food which meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and 
healthy life”.10 More recently, important developments in nutrition science and food 
processing techniques have contributed to changing practices in global food security 
governance, such as intergovernmental deliberations on the efficacy of new biotechnologies 
for food security.11  
 
Diffusion of food security across global governance 
As a result of these other developments, responsibility for food security is now spread out 
across the global governance landscape. No longer the exclusive domain of the Rome based 
UN food agencies, the FAO, the WFP and the IFAD, food security now also falls under the 
remit of the international human rights system as well as refugee agencies and their 
regional and non-governmental partners. Technical spheres of governance such as setting 
international food safety and nutrition standards are overseen by the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission, which involves the FAO, the World Health Organization (WHO), states, 
private actors, academics and non-governmental organizations. The World Trade 
Organization (WTO) also plays a key role as an inter-state forum for negotiating rules on 
agricultural policies that are directly relevant to food security.12 In short, the global 
governance of food security today is highly disaggregated across many institutions and 
involves state and non-state actors.  
 
Institutional Responses to the 2008 Global Food Crisis: CFS, CFA and G8/G20  
The 2008 global food crisis led the international community to devise new institutional 
responses. The CFS, the CFA and the developments with G8/G20 can be considered to be 
critical institutional developments in global food security governance, reflecting, 
respectively,  ‘something old, something new, and something borrowed’. This allusion to a 
traditional English good luck phrase for a bride to be is deliberately invoked to emphasize 
the interconnectedness of disparate objects that support a new collective endeavor. This 
section addresses the unique characteristics of each institution and their role in 
contemporary global food security governance, and situates this within the longer term 
patterns of transformation in global food security governance discussed above.  
 
Something old: the Committee for World Food Security  
The CFS has the longest pedigree of the newer food security governance institutions, 
having been established in 1975 as a standing committee of the FAO to monitor the 
outcome of the 1974 World Food Conference.13 The original mandate of the CFS was to 
assist developing countries to implement national food reserves and coordinate the 
management of these reserves across developed and developing countries and other market 
 actors. Immediately following the 1973 world food crisis, the world food situation 
improved considerably and states shifted their focus away from food policy. Efforts to 
establish food reserves waned, as did interest in the CFS. The CFS enjoyed revived 
fortunes in 1995/1996 when it became the principal forum for inter-state negotiation in 
preparation of the 1996 World Food Summit. The World Food Summit  successfully put 
food security on the global agenda and resulted in considerable commitments by states to 
fight hunger as articulated in the Plan of Action adopted at the World Food Summit .14 
Another outcome of the World Food Summit  was an enhanced role for a rejuvenated CFS 
charged with responsibility for monitoring the implementation of the Plan of Action.15 This 
revised mandate for the CFS heightened its visibility through its public monitoring of world 
hunger and resulted in the development of a new FAO flagship publication, The State of 
Food Insecurity in the World, to provide updates on world food security and in-depth 
analysis of key food security policy issues. This normally annual publication has since 
become highly influential in setting the global food security policy agenda. In addition, 
international NGOs’ (INGOs) participation in the work of the CFS increased. According to 
McKeon these changes have been critical to advancing a progressive food security agenda 
at the FAO and enhancing the legitimacy of the CFS’s work.16  
Nevertheless, in the years immediately prior to the 2008 global food crisis, there 
was growing concern expressed among member states and the FAO secretariat about the 
ability of the CFS to fulfill its monitoring functions. One concern highlighted by an 
independent evaluation was that the CFS had become less focused in its activity and less 
efficient, especially after its completion of the negotiations of the Voluntary Guidelines to 
Support the Progressive Realization of the Right to Adequate Food in the Context of 
National Food Security.17 Thus, in early 2008, on the eve of the global food crisis, FAO 
member states were discussing ways to improve the efficacy and efficiency of the CFS. The 
initial vision for a reformed CFS was introduced at the 34th session of the CFS held in 
October 2008. The main recommendations that were adopted called for a reduction in the 
frequency of meetings from twice to once per annum, a reduction in the length of CFS 
meetings, including in the number of agenda items, the organization of sessions along a 
central substantive topic, and the streamlining of the drafting of the reports.18 
These recommendations, particularly reducing the frequency and length of CFS 
meetings, can be interpreted as an effort to diminish the Committee’s profile and reign in its 
scope of activity. This new format would likely have contributed to the weakening of 
established levels of interpersonal trust and understanding that results directly from 
frequent and iterative interaction among policymakers. Less frequent and shorter meetings 
would have reduced the ability of the CFS to address emerging food security issues in a 
timely manner. As such, these initial recommendations could hardly be interpreted to be in 
the spirit of supporting the CFS’s role but suggested efforts to establish a minimalist 
version of the Committee. 
Given that initial efforts to reform suggested a diminished body, it is all the more 
notable that the final outcome of CFS reform resulted in an enlarged, expanded and higher 
profile institution. The actual reform of the CFS must be contextualized vis-à-vis the global 
food crisis; the discourse of the CFS reform at the official and informal level repeatedly 
made reference to the crisis as a driver for reform. Negotiations for the reform of the CFS 
were conducted over an 18 month period and the outcome was approved by FAO members 
 at the 2009 World Summit for Food Security. The negotiations involved a novel organizing 
mechanism, the so-called ‘Contact Group’, designed to ensure input from a wide range of 
relevant stakeholders, including FAO member states, multilateral institutions, the UN High 
Level Task Force on the Global Food Security (HLTF), the UN Special Rapporteur on the 
Right to Food, INGOs and the private sector. The new role of the CFS includes significant 
reorientation and expansion of its mandate in order to: 
1. Coordinate food security policy discussions and collaboration at the global and regional 
level among all relevant stakeholders; 
2. Promote policy convergence and coordination on food security and nutrition; 
3. Support and advise countries and regions on the achievement of food security and the 
practical application of the Voluntary Guidelines to Support the Progressive Realization 
of the Right to Adequate Food in the Context of National Food Security; 
4. Develop a Global Strategic Framework for food security and nutrition.19 
This expanded mandate is transforming the CFS from an institution whose central 
role was to be the caretaker of a time-bound and limited objective (i.e., reducing hunger in 
half by 2015 in the 1996 World Food Summit  Plan of Action), into one tasked with 
becoming ‘the foremost inclusive international and intergovernmental platform’ to achieve 
the elimination of hunger and ensuring food security and nutrition for all.20 This new role 
will be a major challenge. In addition, the reformed CFS acknowledges the centrality of a 
human rights-based approach to food security. The human rights focus suggests the CFS 
will facilitate greater linkages between agriculture, food and trade policies with 
international human rights norms. Successfully establishing and operationalizing these 
linkages would mark a considerable accomplishment, particularly given that the economic 
and social development dimensions of governance have long been said to exist in worlds of 
solitude.21  
This overhaul of the architecture of the CFS also has significant implications for 
global food security governance practice. Although states retain exclusive voting rights at 
CFS meetings, non-state actors have been given greater roles in the Committee’s 
governance. This includes a select group of non-state actors; representatives of multilateral 
institutions and global civil society that have strong relevance to issues of food security and 
nutrition that are now designated as participants. Participants enjoy special privileges; they 
are permitted to take part in the work of the Committee with the right to intervene in 
plenary and breakout discussions, to contribute to preparation of meeting documents and 
agendas, and to submit and present documents and formal proposals.22 The rights of 
participants differ substantially from the rights of observers, a category that remains for 
other groups who do not have automatic rights to intervene and participate in all aspects of 
the Committee’s work. Participants in the CFS include the HLTF, WFP, World Bank and 
WTO, and representatives from transnational peasant movements, such as the Via 
Campesina, INGOs, such as Oxfam, and philanthropic organizations, such as the Bill and 
Melinda Gates Foundation. Even though the CFS remains by definition an ‘inter-
governmental body’ that reaffirms the role of states as central actors, in practice, it will 
primarily function as a truly transnational institution with a highly diverse membership not 
limited to states. Indeed, the reformed CFS attains a high degree of pluralism not frequently 
observed in other global governance institutions.  
 Most of the elements of the pre-global food crisis CFS reform package have not 
come to pass. For example, the frequency of meetings was not reduced but increased 
instead. Indeed, the assumption by policymakers going forward is that the CFS will 
significantly increase its range of activities, not reduce them. To support this expanded 
mandate, the CFS has created several new supportive apparati: a Bureau made up of the 
broader membership of the CFS to guide the work program and prepare for plenary 
sessions; a permanent CFS Secretariat to replace the one which had previously operated on 
an ad hoc basis; and a High Level Panel Committee of Experts (HLPE) composed of a 
rotating group of experts in areas related to the scientific, policy and social dimensions of 
food security to provide evidence-based and expert advice to the CFS Plenary and Bureau 
to aid the Committee in its policy deliberations. In sum, following the global food crisis 
there has been a major reorientation in the proposed reform of the CFS that has resulted in 
an expanded and strengthened Committee that features a greater transnational character.   
 
Something new: The Comprehensive Framework for Action  
The Comprehensive Framework for Action (CFA) represents a novel institutional 
development in global food security governance. The CFA is a multilateral consensus 
policy document, however, it should not be mistaken for an international commitment, set 
of standards, or new food security rules. It is best understood as an aggregation of the 
policy priorities and preferences of multilateral institutions.  
The CFA sets out the joint position of all the multilateral institutions that are 
members of the HLTF. In April 2008, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon proposed the 
idea of a task force to heads of the FAO, World Bank, WTO and WFP during a regular 
meeting of the UN Chief Executives Board (CEB).23 The executive leadership of these 
organizations all agreed on the need for a coordinated, coherent and collective response 
given the severity of the food crisis. Such a collective response by institutions was 
consistent with ongoing efforts to pool resources and expertise to maximize policy 
interventions. Working collectively was also intended to signal to countries affected by the 
global food crisis, and to donor states holding the purse strings, that multilaterals could be 
trusted with scarce resources to address rising food insecurity. The HLTF currently boasts 
22 members, including UN agencies active in the field of agriculture, food security and 
humanitarian assistance, as well as international economic governance institutions such as 
the World Bank, WTO and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD). The UN Secretary General chairs the HLTF and the FAO Director General is 
vice-chair. The everyday work of the HLTF is overseen by the HLTF Coordinator, who is 
also the UN Special Representative on Food Security and Nutrition, and supported by a 
small secretariat based in Geneva and Rome. It is by far the largest grouping of UN and 
non-UN institutions to work collaboratively on a single global policy issue to date. 
The text of the CFA was negotiated among HLTF members quite rapidly over a 
four month period and disseminated in July 2008.24 The CFA has been recognized as a key 
policy framework at several forums, including the High Level Summit on World Food 
Security, the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and by the G8. The CFA has 
articulated a common set of policy interventions and objectives that reflect the input from 
all the HLTF member institutions. The CFA identifies eight priority areas for coordinated 
action by international organizations, states and other relevant stakeholders. The priority 
 areas are sub-divided into four short-term policies: enhancing access to emergency food 
and social assistance; increasing smallholder food production; adjusting tax and trade 
policies that negatively affect food consumers; managing macroeconomic implications of 
financing food imports and consumption; as well as four longer-term policies: expanding 
social protection systems; sustaining improvements in smallholder food production; 
improving international food markets; and developing an international biofuels policy. 
Given space limitations, it is not possible to address each of these policy areas in detail. 
However, it is striking that the CFA encompasses policy issues spanning traditional food 
security policies, such as food assistance and agricultural investment, as well as new food 
security issues like environmental sustainability and macroeconomic policies. In short, the 
CFA articulates policy responses to the multiple and complex factors that cause food 
security instead of focusing on a single issue. 
The CFA does not impose specific obligations on individual states. In fact, there 
was an explicit decision by HLTF members to steer away from calling for a specific 
financial commitment.25 Nevertheless, it is critical to recognize the CFA as an achievement 
in intra-institutional cooperation given the diverging mandates, operational expertise, 
interests, political constraints and resources of each HLTF member.26 This is why the CFA 
reads like a mosaic; breadth was necessary in order to ensure a shared approach politically 
acceptable to all HLTF members. Another important contribution of the HLTF and CFA 
process was that it provided a more neutral forum for increased dialogue and engagement 
by multilateral institutions, in particular among their executive leadership. It is important to 
recall that such executive leadership is much more accustomed to negotiating with their 
state principals rather than with other institutions. As such, the CFA should be understood 
as the outcome of a supranational-level process in which multilateral organizations were the 
primary actors. Although states and NGOs were informally consulted and updated on the 
course of the negotiations, they were not direct participants. The CFA is also a living 
document. In its efforts to update the CFA to better reflect the evolving dynamics of food 
insecurity, the HLTF engages continuously in stakeholder consultation, including 
increasing engagement with states, regional organizations and NGOs.27 Indeed, to address 
the criticisms of several HLTF members and other stakeholders, an updated CFA (UCFA) 
was released in September 2010, which includes significant changes, particularly a greater 
emphasis on the gendered dimensions of food insecurity and the human right to food.28  
Since 2009, the HLTF’s work has shifted to ensuring greater operational coherence 
across multilateral, regional and bilateral policy interventions at the country level. For 
example, the HLTF has reviewed programs in 50 countries to ensure that multilateral and 
other partners are supporting receiving governments in a timely and coordinated manner. 
The work of the HLTF at the country level also seeks to identify mechanisms for better 
coordination among all actors grounded firmly in the objectives of the CFA to measurably 
improve food security outcomes in high risk countries and accountability of all partners. 
From a policy coherence and efficiency perspective, the HLTF’s country level work is 
consistent with the international community’s call for greater country ownership, strategic 
and coordinated action from all partners, complementary short and long term interventions, 
a strong role for multilateral institutions, and sustained and substantial commitment by all 
partners. All of these objectives directly correspond with the Rome Principles for 
Sustainable Global Food Security agreed to at the 2009 World Summit on Food, which set 
 out the contemporary approach to international cooperation on food security.29 However, 
the HLTF’s shift to coordination at the country level has not been complemented with 
follow-up on unresolved issues such as trade bans and biofuels, both of which are identified 
as priority areas of the CFA. This suggests that the HLTF has been less able to influence or 
is less willing to participate in areas where there is less international consensus. 
 
Something borrowed: the G8/G20 
Since 2008, the G8 and G20 have emerged as key ‘institutions’ in global food security 
governance. In truth, the G8 and G20 are informal international institutions, better 
described as political fora in which the world’s advanced, and now also emerging 
developing countries, meet and seek to establish consensus on pressing economic, security 
and international development issues.30 The G8 and G20 are intertwined; the G20 is, of 
course, an expansion of the original G7/8 members of advanced economies, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada and Russia, to 
include emerging and middle-income countries such as Brazil, India, China, Mexico, 
Argentina, South Africa, South Korea, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Although the 
G20 is regarded as a more inclusive, and therefore more legitimate grouping of states than 
the G8 because of its inclusion of the majority of the world’s population and economic 
activity, poor developing countries, including the world’s most food insecure countries, 
remain excluded. The G8 continues to meet, however, since 2009 the G20 has effectively 
replaced the G8 as the leading forum for high-level policy making and coordination.   
The G8/G20 hold annual summits that feature meetings of heads of state and 
counterpart ministers, the agendas for which are finalized over a year-long process of 
exchanges among civil servants. The outcomes of the G8/G20 summits usually take the 
form of declarations and communiqués that iterate a consensus position on major policy 
issues. States have frequently utilized summits as high-level events to announce new 
intergovernmental initiatives and/or financial commitments. This has included, for 
example, a commitment of $US 60 billion for the G8 Action Plan for Africa at the 2002 
Kananaskis G8 Summit. In the past, summits have led to international cooperation on 
counterterrorism, financial regulation and official development assistance. Whereas the 
G8/G20 lack the traditional infrastructure of formal international institutions, they have 
evolved procedures to enhance their legitimacy as global governance institutions. Even 
though G8/G20 commitments are nonbinding, Kirton argues these states have invested 
significant political capital towards improving compliance and transparency of their 
commitments. Reputation matters to the G8/G20 and these states have enhanced monitoring 
and public reporting in recent years.31  
The rising challenge of food security was first discussed by G8 heads of state at the 
2008 summit in Hokkaido, Japan. The initial summit agenda did not include food security. 
However, the rapidly deteriorating world food security situation and rising food prices 
throughout early 2008, and the attention to the food crisis in the international press and by 
public authorities, had put food security onto the global policy agenda. The proposal to add 
food security to the G8’s summit agenda was not unanimously supported. The United 
States, Canada, Russia and several European Union member states were reticent because 
their policies on, inter alia, grain-based biofuel production and export bans had been 
widely criticized as causal factors of the 2008 global food crisis. The Japanese Prime 
 Minister, Yasuo Fukuda, enrolled the support of British Prime Minister, the UN Secretary-
General and World Bank President to support an initiative to include rising food prices to 
the summit agenda. 32 This proved effective in putting food security on the G8’s agenda in 
the face of opposition from food exporting G8 countries.  
During the 2008 Hokkaido Summit the G8 leaders discussed emergency food 
assistance, rising food prices, biofuel policies, agricultural export restrictions and food 
reserves. Although G8 states agreed to immediately increase financial support for 
emergency food assistance there was a lack of consensus on the remaining issues. 
Nevertheless, G8 heads of state issued a declaration, the Leaders Statement on Global Food 
Security33 that reiterated the concern about rising world hunger, the need for renewed 
support investment in developing country agriculture and the need to mainstream food 
security in development cooperation. On the issue of governance, the G8 called for a 
‘global partnership on agriculture and food’ among the G8, international institutions and 
other stakeholders. In addition, G8 leaders tasked their agricultural ministers to come up 
with policy recommendations for consideration at the 2009 G8 summit and established an 
Experts Group to monitor individual members’ contributions towards supporting global 
food security. This work agenda was followed up at the 2009 Summit in L’Aquila, Italy. In 
advance of the 2009 Summit the first ever meeting of G8 agriculture ministers was held, 
mirroring, to a certain extent, the G8 pattern of delegating responsibility to ministers for 
specific functional areas as had previously been the practice with finance ministers. In their 
meetings, the agriculture ministers discussed international food trade and the impacts of the 
global economic crisis on food security, arguing that agriculture and food security was now 
at the core of the international agenda.34 At L’Aquila, G8 leaders made food security a 
priority item. In their final declaration, the L’Aquila Food Security Initiative (AFSI), G8 
leaders stressed the critical importance of addressing food security and promoting 
agricultural production in food insecure developing countries.35 To this end, G8 leaders 
committed themselves to providing $US 20 billion over three years to support sustainable 
agriculture development and ensure adequate emergency food assistance.36 The AFSI was 
endorsed by a diversity of actors, including many developing countries, the African Union, 
the UN and the World Bank, all of which were invited to attend the summit.  
The AFSI marks the first time G8 discussions on food security resulted in a fixed 
financial commitment. Past G8 statements of support for fighting food insecurity and 
supporting agriculture, such as the 1997 Partnership for Development in Africa, the 2001 
Strategic Approach to Poverty Reduction, and the 2005 Increasing Agricultural 
Productivity in Africa,37 had not previously resulted in any credible financial commitment. 
In addition, the creation of the AFSI suggests a more central role for the G8 in food security 
governance. Whereas the G8 had repeatedly supported the work of the HLTF and reform of 
the CFS, the AFSI affirmed the desire of G8 states to retain some authority over 
developments in global food security governance. Indeed, with the G20 replacing the G8 in 
2009, there was an effort to give the G8 new relevance by focusing on key social and 
development issues such as food security. By late 2009 the G8 machinery had taken up 
greater technical and operational responsibility for food security with agriculture, 
development and finance ministers increasingly mainstreaming global food security into G8 
officials’ policy work.  
 However, high level political decision making on food security appears to be 
shifting out of the G8 and into the G20. At the 2009 G20 summit in Pittsburgh, USA, states 
repackaged the AFSI and delegated administration for a new agricultural investment credit 
facility called the Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP) to the World 
Bank.38 The GAFSP is now operational and although yet to receive the full amount of 
donors’ financial pledges, it has disbursed over $US 345 million for improving agricultural 
production in 12 developing countries.39 Food security also featured in the 2010 G20 
leaders’ Seoul Development Consensus for Shared Growth.40 In Seoul, G20 members 
agreed to deepen their policy engagement on food security in several key areas: policies to 
reduce agricultural price volatility to addressing escalating food prices; rules for investment 
in agriculture in response to concerns about farmland grabs in developing countries; 
identification of best practices for improving sustainable food production; and, 
enhancement of market access opportunities for smallholder farmers.41  
At the 2011 G20 Summit, French President Nicholas Sarkozy identified food 
security a priority issue. Indeed, the G20 discussed food security in the context of global 
financial reform because of the growing concern over speculation in commodity markets 
and food price volatility. In advance of the summit, the G20 tasked the World Bank, FAO, 
IFAD, WTO and OECD to provide states with policy options and recommendations on 
these issues. On 23 June 2011, G20 ministers of agriculture met and agreed to an “Action 
Plan on Food Price Volatility and Agriculture” that was informed by the recommendations 
of the multilateral organizations. Although the Action Plan has yet to become 
operationalized, G20 ministers agreed to the following framework at the 2011 Cannes 
Summit:  
1. Improvement of agricultural production and productivity both in the short and long 
term in order to respond to a growing demand for agricultural commodities;  
2. Increasing market information and transparency in order to better anchor expectations 
from governments and economic operators;  
3. Strengthening international policy coordination in order to enhance confidence in 
international markets and to prevent and respond to food market crises more efficiently;  
4. Improving and developing risk management tools for governments, firms and farmers 
in order to build capacity to manage and mitigate the risks associated with food price 
volatility, in particular in the poorest countries;  
5. Improving the functioning of agricultural commodities’ derivatives markets. 
To date, the most concrete decision arising from the Action Plan has been G20 support for 
an emergency food reserve pilot program to be headed by the WFP in partnership with the  
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).42 
The G20’s work on food security has now diffused into its various ministerial 
groupings, not only at the level of agriculture ministers but also for development and 
finance ministers. Put in perspective, the G8/G20 have come to play a major role in setting 
the global policy agenda for food security through its ministerial communiqués and through 
their capacity to leverage significant financial resources into new commitments. 
 
 
Managing Interactions among the CFS, CFA and G8/G20 
 The G8/G20, CFA and CFS all make claim to exercising central authority in global food 
security governance. G8/G20 leaders claim leadership in a new ‘Global Partnership on 
Agriculture and Food’. The HLTF claims authority to steer the work of UN agencies and 
other international institutions. The CFS claims responsibility for coordinating a global 
approach to food security among a diversity of stakeholders. If each of these three 
institutions hold central positions in global food security governance, then what is the 
relationship among them? It is clear that there is no official overarching framework that 
defines the relationship between the HLTF/CFA, G8/G20 and CFS. They cannot be said to 
be arranged in a nested manner and there is no formal mechanism that coordinates between 
them. Yet these institutions interact on an increasingly regular, albeit ad hoc basis. This 
suggests that there is some sort of relationship, even if it not entirely formalized.  
One typical approach to analyzing multilateral affairs is to identify hierarchical 
relationships. Scholars of international institutions often seek to understand hierarchy 
through principal-agent relationships, where states (principals) delegate authority to 
international institutions (agents).43 Yet principal-agent theory does not map well in this 
case. States are clearly the primary actors in the G8/G20. However, the G8/G20 is an 
exclusive forum where states interact directly and not through agents. Admittedly, the 
G8/G20 delegate specific tasks to international institutions such as the World Bank. 
However, this delegation is not equivalent to the contract at the core of the principal-agent 
relationship. On the other end of the spectrum, the HLTF/CFA excludes states all together. 
 Scholars have argued that international institutions enjoy independence and 
autonomy from their principals and that this provides them with the capacity to be credible 
actors in global governance.44 We see that members of the HLTF have acted on their 
independent authority, not on direct orders from states, because the formulation of the CFA 
was initiated by the multilateral institutions without any direct prompting by states. The 
case of the CFS also challenges traditional notions of hierarchy because non-state actors 
enjoy rights and privileges that were previously only available to states. This has the 
equivalent effect of diluting states’ claims to exclusive authority in that particular context 
with multilateral institutions and civil society now having significant influence over the 
CFS’ agenda and its policy work.  
Dense exchanges occur between the HLTF, CFS and G8/G20. Much of this is the 
result of overlapping memberships and repeated patterns of interaction between them. At 
the state level, we observe that member states of the G8 are also voting member states of 
the CFS and the CFS Bureau. The G8/G20 has also often endorsed the CFA and CFS, 
which has the effect of increasing the political legitimacy of these latter institutions. At the 
multilateral institutional level, many of the key members of the HLTF, the FAO, IFAD, 
WFP, WTO, World Bank and IMF, are also participants at the CFS, including the HLTF 
coordinator. More recently, the HLTF coordinator and many of the international institutions 
have been requested to provide policy advice and recommendations to G20 leaders and 
ministers, thus feeding into that exclusively inter-state forum. This suggests a dynamic, 
web-like set of cooperative and functional linkages across and through the HLTF, CFS and 
G8/G20 and their constituent states and institutional members. These dense exchanges 
could well support a decentralized, networked view of global governance. 
Another approach to understanding this relationship and to deciphering the 
relationship among multiple actors in global governance is to identify whether interactions 
 are leading to policy coherence or incoherence.45 In a situation where multiple, specialized 
international institutions are working on food security issues, policy coherence is more 
likely to occur when actors pursue policies in a coordinated, integrated manner.46 A reading 
of all the key policy documents of the HLTF, CFS and G8/G20 suggests a high level of 
policy coherence and convergence. Indeed, the three institutions repeatedly cross reference 
each other’s objectives and principles in an explicit attempt to work in a coherent manner. 
More specifically, all three institutions agree on increasing investment in agriculture, 
increasing smallholder food production, enhancing social protection, and greater 
coordination between national, regional and international levels. The HLTF, CFS and 
G8/G20 share policy objectives, exchange information regularly (for example at meetings 
of the CEB, CFS and G20 working groups), and pool resources by engaging in joint 
research projects and producing co-authored policy documents.  
Therefore, from a policy studies perspective at least, overlapping memberships 
ensure a steady flow of information across all three institutions and shared policy objectives 
ensures coordination and convergence of technical work and policy interventions. Because 
of these dense patterns of exchange, there can be said to be de facto coordination across the 
work of the G8/G20, HLTF/CFA and CFS that enables a high degree of policy coherence. 
However, a closer look at each of these institutions reveals occurrences of divergent 
aims, disagreements and nascent political conflicts. For example the G8/G20 have preferred 
to steer shy of developing regulatory guidelines for international biofuel policy, despite 
recommendations from the HLTF for such a policy and direct pressure from global civil 
society and many developing countries. The CFS, on the other hand, has proposed more 
stringent rules on foreign investment in agricultural land to prevent illegal land grabs and 
on agricultural derivatives markets to limit food price volatility. In this way, the CFS 
supports more robust policy measures that have called for greater transparency from 
financial actors than the G8/G20. Diverging perspectives on the appropriate policy 
responses suggest that there is still considerable contestation in global food security 
governance. However, because there is no centralizing mechanism it is unclear how such 
contestation is to be resolved. A political realist perspective would suggest that state 
interests trump in the end.47 Thus, it would follow that the G8/G20 will have the final say in 
global deliberations. The authority of the G8/G20 is rooted in the sovereign authority of 
nation-states. However, the G8/G20 claims of legitimacy are more complex. Even though 
G8/G20 member states exercise disproportionate power in global political and economic 
affairs, they cannot claim universality or to speak for the world. On the other end of the 
spectrum, the key roles played by HLTF and reformed CFS show that non-state actors are 
exerting significant influence in global food security governance, including the ability to 
shape global policy agendas and influence states’ decision making. The HLTF’s authority 
and legitimacy is twofold, partially rooted in the political and moral authority of the UN 
Secretary General to act in the interests of the global community and in the moral authority 
of the WFP and OHCHR, and partially in the technical and expert authority of the FAO and 
World Bank.48 The CFS is unique in that its authority and legitimacy are a combination of 
its transnationalism and its multi-stakeholder representation; it enjoys the political authority 
of states and technical and moral authority of international institutions and global civil 
society participants. This latter development is consistent with findings from global 
governance scholarship showing a greater role for non-state actors, including international 
 institutions, NGOs, philanthropic organizations and the private sector, in contemporary 
global governance.49  
 
Conclusion 
The 2008 global food crisis was the catalyst for the development of new institutions in 
global food security governance. The institutions, the CFS, HLTF/CFA and G8/G20, vary 
significantly in their memberships, mandates and sources of authority and legitimacy. Each 
of these institutions claims a central position in global food security governance. Despite 
sharing policy objectives and engaging in formal, informal and ad hoc coordination, there 
is still considerable contestation among these three institutions over the future direction of 
global food security governance. These contests cannot be resolved through state consensus 
alone and the CFA and CFS provide significant scope for non-state actors to exert influence 
and claim legitimate roles in global food security governance. In short, global food security 
governance appears to be shifting towards greater pluralism. The inclusion of transnational 
peasant groups as participants at the CFS, for example, has given voice to actors 
historically excluded from participating in global governance. Such changes can potentially 
enhance the legitimacy of global food security governance by providing food insecure and 
vulnerable populations direct participation in the decisions that affect their lives. At the 
same time, greater pluralism in global governance can also amplify tensions and conflicts if 
there are divergent views. Such effects are most likely to become evident at the CFS in the 
coming years once its new architecture and deliberation processes become routinized.  
Current efforts are underway to enhance cooperation among the CFA/HLTF, CFS 
and G8/G20 and their highly diverse constituent members. At the time of writing, the CFS 
has launched consultations for a ‘Global Strategic Framework’ to further clarify the role of 
the reformed CFS and its relationship to the CFA and the G20 proposal for a Global 
Partnership on Food and Agriculture. It was expected that the G20 leaders meeting at 
Cannes would better clarify the relationship between the G20, the HLTF and CFS. 
However, this did not occur. This was partially the result of diverging views among G20 
states over how this relationship should be best managed. In addition, the strong leadership 
by international institutions and disagreements among them over the most appropriate inter-
institutional architecture played a part as well. As a result, the global food security 
governance remains in a state of flux and reminds us of the fact that governance is a 
dynamic and iterative process. 
 Although there is a broad consensus for an increase in dialogue and coordination, it 
is difficult to predict what the long term relationship between the G8/G20, CFA/HLTF and 
CFS may look like. In any event, it is unlikely that states will make such a critical decision 
on their own. They will look to international institutions and non-state actors for expertise, 
leadership, and willing partnership. Improving the global governance of food security 
requires consensus among all actors involved to be truly effective. Broad based consensus, 
cooperation and participation among states and non-state actors, is an increasingly accepted 
global approach to address the challenge of food security. 
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